From a Struggle for Democracy to an Ethno-Fascist Mob: How a
Genuine Oromo Youth (Queerroo) Movement is Hijacked, Radicalised and
Derailed From its Course
Contact
information:
Girma Berhanu
Department of
Education and Special Education (Professor)
University of
Gothenburg
Box 300, SE 405
30
Göteborg, Sweden
E-mail: Girma.Berhanu@ped.gu.se
The mob of young men, carrying machetes,
marched into the neighborhood with a list of names and ethnicities of its
residents. "This land is Oromo land," they chanted.
Hundreds were killed during a recent attack on mostly non Oromos in
the Oromo region. Thousands were injured and most of the victims are members of
the Amhara, Gurage etc. ethnic groups. The reports[1]
which just arrived, detail horrible killings[2],
looting and other violence targeting non Oromos. Armed groups of so called
Queeroo,[3]
according to the reports, carried out these organized attacks against members
of other ethnic groups. The attacks were driven by a misguided urge to fully get
rid of non-Oromos from the entire region.
Schools, hospitals, business centers, places of worship and public
facilities were attacked and destroyed, and houses and villages burned down.
While
I was writing this analysis, ‘tens of thousands of Ethiopians took to the
street in Washington DC and London to protest the ethnic and religious-based killings in the Oromo region of Ethiopia[4].
Carrying Ethiopia’s popular and historical flag, the protesters also called for
the demobilization of ethnic-based special forces: the Oromo regional state has
trained about thirty rounds of special force recruits, and all the regions have
their own special forces. According to local reports, there were instances
whereby the local security forces collaborated with the killers[5].
There were also those who watched indifferently when the radical groups
unleashed their attacks, including beheading an elderly man in his late 70’s
(Borkena July 17, 2020)[6].
The
latest attack occurred within a few hours in the first week of July. From our
knowledge of the distribution of arms to the group (mostly machetes) and to the
local police forces (mostly firearms), we can derive a general hypothesis on
the objectives of the coordinators of the atrocity. Corroboratively, the objective of the group was to kill as
many Amharas and members of other ethnic groups as possible within short time. Indeed,
much evidence confirms that traditional weapons, firearms, grenades and
bullets were not used at random but in a deliberately targeted and efficient manner.
The madness of the radicalised
ethnocentric Oromo “nationalists”, under OLF ideology, has lately manifested
itself not only in the motherland Ethiopia but also abroad in the USA, Europe
and other foreign countries. The so-called Oromo nationalists have been
protesting abroad in various very violent manners, disturbingly vandalizing
monuments[7]
and causing widespread fear and deep insecurity to the public.[8]
What
went wrong with this group of people, Queeroo at home and Queeroo abroad?[9]
The horrible acts of the Queeroo abroad
are countless. They are tantamount to
acts of terrorism. To be considered an act of terrorism, it must be violent or threatening violence. The
inclusion of damage to private and
public property, in the definition of terrorism, is a point of
contention but it is generally accepted in legal and statistical contexts. The
act must also be carried out for political,
economic, religious, or social interests and purposes － to count as terrorism. To be
classified as terrorism, actions must be designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the
immediate victim or target. Additionally, the act or acts must be targeting non-combatant, neutral, or
randomly chosen people.[10] This
is a very serious matter; it is an act of despair.[11]
It requires due attention and due diligence by the authorities.[12]
In this paper, the main focus is upon the transformation of the Queerroo from a peaceful non-violent political movement
calling for achievement of a democratic country, whereby no citizen will
continue being marginalized and disregarded, into the now overwhelmingly
radicalized rampaging extreme ethnocentric anarchist mobs. Initially, the movement symbolized
the Oromo struggle for increased political freedom and greater ethnic
representation in the government of Ethiopia. Jawar Mohammed
has played a key role in both forms of the movement; he has promoted an “Oromo first” ideology. The movement was earlier
credited with having successfully conducted the mass strike that helped topple the Prime Minister of one of Africa’s
most autocratic governments.[13] However, since Prime
Minister Abiy (himself an Oromo by ethnicity) came to power, the
gravity of the content of the narrative has changed. Indeed, the ethnic-nationalist narrative has taken a much
more dominant sphere. New forms of destabilisation
narratives, and hate speech openly uttered by the
political elites as well as some sections of groups of the Queeroo, have been
repeatedly documented. Most
of those speeches are inciting hatred and conflicts, apparently
intended to destroy the peacefully
woven inter-ethnic relationships prevailing in the country.[14]
According to Terje Østebø (2020) the Queeroo movement
emerged as a significant political actor in the course of the Oromo protests, but
its subsequent trajectory has been very complex. Having started humbly and
grown as a massive opposition movement, it became instrumental in the
transition that brought Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to power. And yet it has
become most critical towards him! There are many unknowns regarding the Queeroo.
Accordingly, it seems to be of particular relevance to pose questions, and
explain them, regarding where the movement is today, how last years’ political
changes have impacted the movement, and what potential role it may play in the
future politics of the motherland Ethiopia.
The rather controversial protest leader Jawar, considered the hero of
the Oromo movement, is widely praised by his Querroo followers and
the extremist ethnocentric Oromo elite, for
“building a solid ground network” in most of the region. However, most observers fear for the violent behavior
of his very undisciplined Queeroo[15]and
their atrocities against the ethnic minorities resident within the Oromo region[16]. Their language is
often unrestrained and full of fabricated narratives, or inaccurate historical facts, such as: “the Oromo are native to every
territory they currently occupy and everyone else residing in it is a settler”;
and “the Ethiopian state is created by Amhara monarchs who colonized a helpless
Oromo population”; as well as “the Oromo are marginalized economically, with
their resources exploited for the benefit of others, especially the Amhara.”
“The youth moved the struggle we have been
undertaking for the last 50 years one step forward,” said Merera Gudina, leader
of the Oromo Federalist Congress. “The PM makes a lot of promises. If he cannot
walk his talk, then he’ll face the youth, definitely.”[17]
In a recent article, Terje Østebø (May 2020) noted:[18]
While the Qeerroo’s decentralized and informal character has been a
political force, it poses, at the same time, certain challenges. First of all,
it is a movement that is difficult to control. One informant pointed to the
dire socio-economic situation among Oromo youth, arguing that “when they live
with little hope, and when they think of past injustices, they can be difficult
to control.” Another challenge of its decentralized character is how it has
become open for government interference and vulnerable to internal divisions.
Lack of coherent horizontal structures and defined leadership created at the
outset limitations for the movement, which seems to be exacerbated by the co-option
of local leaders. Oromo youth across the region lamented these developments,
feeling dispirited and “left alone.” Frustrated about their own and the broader
political situation, the general sentiment was the lack of any meaningful
directions.
2.
The
Queeroo after the 2018 political transformation
If the movement
was relatively peaceful before the coming to power of an Oromo prime minister,
what transformed it into extremely violent groups. The paradox is that the
country is being heavily “oromized”, with very important positions occupied by
the Oromos. According to observers, the country (in particular Addis Ababa)
seems to be invaded by new residents
of Oromo descent. There appears to be a sense of “ethnic superiority” and
arrogance by the Oromo intellectuals, according to an Ethiopian sociologist at
AAU. Some observers use the term teregna, signifying “it is our
turn” to dominate and prevail. As Weldemariam (2020)[19]
succinctly put it, “one of the problems with a politics that revolves around
identity is that a desire for equal recognition can easily slide into demands
for recognition of a group’s perceived superiority. Right now, there is an
ascendant majoritarianism combined with violent populism amid a recklessly
managed transition. This is striking fear into minorities, allowing even talk of secession to
reenter the Tigrayan nationalist discourse.”[20]
How did a
genuinely reform-oriented Queeroo (Oromo youth) movement transform into extremely radicalized ethnocentric anarchist fascist
mobs? Did the first generation or round of Queeroo retire and a new one, or several new ones,
emerged with a different agenda? Has the movement been hijacked by extremist
radical groups for a different agenda other than the previous one? My
ambition is not to address all these related questions in one paper but to
highlight the episode and set the stage for subsequent much thorough
discussion.
The Queeroo rose to fame in 2014 through widespread protests among the
youth across Oromia (see Appendix 1). Hence, according to Terje Østebø (May 2020), the
Queeroo came to claim a stake in the new
government; and Team Lemma’s Oromo nationalist rhetoric created strong
expectations among the Oromo, who saw the new Abiy-era as a “now it’s our turn”
moment. The “honeymoon” soon came to an end, however; and Abiy Ahmed’s
popularity gradually gave way for increased skepticism. Following the emergence of a new kind of
conflicts, partly inter-ethnic in nature, which resulted in millions of
internally displaced
people, friction between the extremist ethnocentric Oromo elite and the new
government intensified. At kebele level, in some rural areas, the
Queeroo acted as shadow-governments. As expressed by one informant, “the local authorities
needed to consult with the Queeroo when they made decisions. During the
protests there were cases where local Queeroo groups took matters in their own
hands, where old scores were settled, and where brutal acts of violence were
committed. Lack of effective governing structures moreover unveiled internal
tensions among the Queerroo, leading, in some cases, to conflicts between
different Queerroo groups.”[21]
Generally, the Queerroo movement got out of control; and, with no
guidance and effective leadership, “they don’t have any ultimate goal and
formal leadership… all they do is to fight among themselves” (In Østebø, 2020). A well informed
former diplomat wrote to me that some of those murderers are “headless
chicken” without “a clear ideology”, they don’t have a “leader”, and “they have
the minds of a chicken”. We still have
to learn a lot about the Queeroo groups and the movement as such. In any case, “what
seems clear, however, is that there existed very limited horizontal structures
among the Queeroo across Oromia. Key were the vertical structures
wherein Jawar Mohammed was – and still is – the main hub: “Everything went
through Jawar, it is he who gave the orders.”[22]
As far as we know the main mode of communication has been Facebook. It remains
to be seen whether the Queeroo has outplayed its political role or will again
emerge as a formidable political force.
3.
Assessing the Risk of Atrocity Crimes
The key
observation presented here is that the movement— regardless of its current
structure or whether it is hijacked by extremely radicalized groups within the
Oromo Liberation Front’s ramifications, an offshoot or a structure formed of branches such as OLF Shane[23] –has transformed into genocidal groups, conducting deliberate and systematic
destruction of groups of people living
in the Oromia region, simply because of their ethnicity, nationality or religion. The conceptual analysis is anchored within the Framework of
Analysis for Atrocity Crimes －A tool for
prevention (United Nations, 2014). [24]
For
the purpose of some comparison, the “Hutu Ten Commandments” published
in Kangura, No. 6, (December 1990),[25]
has also been incorporated.
The ethnocentric
fascist dimension of the movement is also analyzed with the help of the tools. Fascism is a movement that promotes the idea of a
forcibly monolithic, regimented nation under the control of an autocratic
ruler. The word fascism comes from fascio, the Italian word for bundle,
which in this case represents bundles of people. Its origins go back to Ancient
Rome, when the fasces was a bundle of wood with an ax head, carried by
leaders[26].
The adoption of violence to impose fascist authority is a key element of
fascism, both as a movement and as a regime. It expresses itself as street violence first,
and then through the militarization of government. Fascist leaders take power
not just through “popular support” but also ruthless violence, thanks to the action of squads that violently attack
opponents.
Those squads of violence are usually subsequently incorporated, as paramilitary
formations, into the running of the state. [27]
An informant characterized the Queerroo movement as being mostly led by OLF’s ideology,
and ´OLF politics is Nazi politics of false flag operation’. Eskinder Nega, a journalist and
activist, has previously compared the organised groupings of Oromo
youth to the Interahamwe youth militia that participated in
the Rwandan genocide.
Paul Henze[28] wrote a letter, dated 30 July, 1992, to the
late Meles Zenawi in which he expressed his assessment about OLF. It could have
been written last week and still just as valid as it was then. Witness some excerpts
from his letter: “...The OLF has created illusions. The OLF tries to represent
the Oromo as victimized by Menelik and never given justice for their
sufferings. They are entitled to their own view of history, but they cannot
require other Ethiopian people to accept it. Much of their history is selective
mythology. They forget that in historical terms the Oromo are one of the newest
peoples in Ethiopia. Europeans in North America [and] Whites in South Africa
have occupied their territories longer than Oromos in the most regions of
Ethiopia….”.[29]
It is that
behavior pattern and characteristics of the ethnocentric Oromo “nationalists”,
outlined in the foregoing, that is the key concern of this paper. The risk factors are not all the same. Some
are structural, such as the weakness of State institutions as witnessed in the
Prime Minister’s government; others pertain to more dynamic circumstances or
events, such as triggering factors of the calibre of the recent murder of the
popular Oromo singer Hachalu Hundessa.
Triggers and other dynamic elements transform general risk into an increased
likelihood that atrocity crimes will be committed.
The Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes
is a tool developed by the United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the
Responsibility to Protect to guide the assessment of the risk of atrocity
crimes worldwide.[30]
The horrible crimes committed by radical ethnocentric “nationalists”—call them
a section of the Queeroo movement, if you wish, or the new Queeroo—are tantamount
to genocide; and there is a whole range of indicators predicting that atrocity
crimes are certainly going to happen
again soon!
The
Framework defines risk factors as the conditions that increase the risk of
or susceptibility to negative outcomes. They include behaviors,
circumstances or elements that create an environment conducive to the
commission of atrocity crimes, or indicate the potential, probability or risk
of their occurrence. The Framework contains two main analytical tools for
assessing the risk of atrocity crimes: (a) a list of fourteen risk factors for
atrocity crimes; and (b) indicators for each of the risk factors.
Among the
fourteen risk factors outlined (see Appendix 4), eight are common to all
crimes, reflecting the fact that atrocity crimes tend to occur in similar
settings and share several elements or features.
Those
risk factor are:
1)
situations of armed conflict or other forms of
instability;
2)
record of serious violations of international human
rights and humanitarian law;
3)
weakness of State structures;
4)
motives and Incentives;
5)
capacity to commit atrocity crimes;
6)
absence of mitigating factors;
7)
enabling circumstances or preparatory action; and
Situations of armed
conflict or other forms of instability
Armed conflicts are underway between
the government forces and armed OLF groups especially in Western
Ethiopia/Wollega. Fighting between
rival ethnic groups in western Ethiopia has displaced tens of thousands of
people with tens or hundreds killed. Violence continuously erupts in Western or
Eastern Ethiopia leaving hundreds of thousands of people displaced. Bank
robbery kidnapping of government officials religious leaders and University
students are all too common in the Oromia region. Atrocity
crimes often take place against a background of this kind of non-international
armed conflict. Our observation is that there is a high incidence of violence,
insecurity and the permissibility of acts that would otherwise not be
acceptable. There are serious levels of political instability, threats to the
security of the country or even volatility in economic or social affairs. All
these highly increase the likelihood of those crimes.
Record of serious
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law
Non Oromos, in particular the Amhara[32],
in the Oromia region have already experienced serious violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law or atrocity crimes. As all the
indicators show the groups are more prone to further atrocity crimes. As
history has demonstrated, atrocity crimes in general and genocide in particular
are preceded by less widespread or systematic serious violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law. This less widespread violations has been conducted by the Tigrean led
government (TPLF) between 1991- 2018 which costed the lives of huge number of
ethnic Amharas.[33] The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, which was one of
the constituent parties of the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic
Front, has always considered ethnic
Amharas an enemy. It has used their
perceived historical dominance as the basis for forming a coalition of
minorities to oppose their push for a united Ethiopia.[34]The legacies of this past atrocity crimes including the latest
ones (0ne in October 2019 and one in July 2020) have not been adequately
addressed through individual criminal accountability, reparation, truth-seeking
and reconciliation processes, as well as comprehensive reform measures in the
security and judicial sectors. A society in this situation is more likely to
resort again to violence as we seen recently.[35]
Weakness of State
structures
The risk of atrocity crimes can be increased by a State’s lack
of capacity to prevent these crimes. A large number of report shows that the
current and the previous government could not protect its population through
the establishment of frameworks and institutions that are guided by the rule of
law and good governance principles. ‘We are investigating reports of security force
violence and lack of response, as well as attacks against ethnic minority communities,
including killings, the destruction of homes and businesses, and displacement,”
said Laetitia Bader, the Human Rights Watch director for the Horn of Africa
region. “So far, property damage appears on a larger scale than in previous
bouts of unrest.”
‘The Great Northern Rift aside, in Abiy’s Ethiopia, all
kinds of other deadly fault lines have resurfaced as an always shaky post-1991
political settlement has collapsed. This has been fueled by the spread of hate
speech and propaganda on mainstream and social media by irresponsible
government officials, social media activists, and journalists. Members of
different ethnic groups have been attacked across the country by a wide variety
of assailants. Sidama and
Wolayta. Guji Oromo and
Gedeo. Gumuz and
Oromo. Amhara and
Gumuz. Oromo and
Dorze. Killing methods have included stoning and lynching. Mob justice has at
times replaced the rule of law and anarchy has almost become the new normal in
some locations. There have been political assassinations, and
inter-ethnic conflicts test the integrity of the security services, as regional
special forces have at times vied with each other. The country is awash with
small arms and rising prices show demand is high for more weaponry[36].
Residents of
Dera who spoke to the M&G claimed that the regional Oromia Special
Police Force did not intervene to stop the violence. According to another
survivor, at least 150 members of the force were housed at Dera’s stadium,
minutes away, as the carnage unfolded[37].
Motives and Incentives
From an early warning perspective, it
is vital to identify motivations, aims or drivers that could influence certain
individuals or groups such as Queeroo to resort to massive violence as a way to
achieve goals, feed an ideology or respond to real or perceived threats. Doing
so not only allows for a higher degree of prediction of the likelihood of those
crimes, but also opens up the opportunity to develop prevention strategies
aimed at neutralizing or curbing those motives or incentives. The motives in
Ethiopia are based on exclusionary ideology or the construction of binary
identities of “us” and “them”. The historical, political, economic or even
cultural environment in which such ideologies develop can also be relevant. The
ethno nationalists accuse
Amhara as a settler colonialist that need to be exterminated. False flag
history of "settler colonialism."[38]
In
Rwanda, ethnic Hutus killed not only their neighbor Tutsis but also their Tutsi
wives. They massacred Tutsis going door-to-door and identifying them by their
ID cards. We have watched similar Amara massacres in Shashemene, Ziway, Adam
Tulu, Harari, Bale, and Arusi regions of Ethiopia within the past two weeks[39]’[40].
The
Globe and Mail in its latest report (2020 July 21) with the title,
Ethiopia’s latest violence exposes ethnic
fault lines, threatening the country’s democratic dreams
The mob of young
men, carrying machetes, marched into the neighborhood with a list of names and
ethnicities of its residents. “This land is Oromo land,” they chanted. Abebech
Shiferaw, a 49-year-old widow of Amhara ethnicity, screamed for her children to
flee as the mob broke into her home. She raced out, carrying her youngest
child, and watched the mob set fire to her house and neighbouring houses in
Shashamene, the epicentre of Ethiopia’s latest violence[41].
Capacity to commit
atrocity crimes
The
systematic and large-scale violence that marks atrocity crimes requires a
substantial level of planning that, in most cases, is sustained over a period
of time. To be able to engage in such conduct, actors aiming at committing
atrocity crimes must have at their substantial resources and support, either
internal or external. A man sheltering
in the church, said: “The killers moved from home to home. They knew their
targets and they were quick and methodical with the way they poured gasoline
over properties. Nobody in town recognised any of them. They aren’t from the
area, but someone from here must have guided them.” The victims are
classified; The symbolization attributed to the victims is nefitegna
as a symbol to identify and kill; the victims are discriminated; they are
dehumanized. And the perpetrators are organized and trained to loot and kill[42].
The attack on
Ms. Shiferaw’s home on June 30 left her and her four children sheltering in a
local church and worried about their safety. “I was born and raised in
Shashamene, it’s the only place I know. But to the rioters, I was suddenly an
outsider who did not belong here,” she says. ……..Munir Ahmed, manager of one of
the city’s most popular restaurants, saw his restaurant destroyed by hundreds
of rioters who were deliberately targeting the non-Oromo businesses on his
street. “We cried, we begged them to stop,” he said. “To them, we were the
enemy. They had a plan, almost like a mission, and they executed what they came
to do. Everything was destroyed.” Most of his employees hid for several days
and then fled the city, he said. “For the first time, our ethnicity is a
burden. The rioters have won”[43]
Absence of mitigating
factors
Atrocity crimes result from a
convergence of elements. Among those elements, some point more directly to the
likelihood of atrocity crimes, while others might have a more indirect effect
and seem secondary, or even too broad to merit consideration. However, even if
indirect, these elements can contribute to preventing an escalation of violence
or even to ending it and can therefore reduce the probability of atrocity
crimes. Presence of strong and representative civil society organizations;
operation of free, diverse and independent media; and access to the country by
international or regional actors, constitute examples of factors that can
mitigate the risk of commission of atrocity crimes. Although it is important to
strengthen mitigating factors as a way of increasing resilience against the
risk of atrocity crimes and for early warning purposes, the current situation
in Ethiopia leaves much to be desired. Lack of an early warning mechanism
relevant to the prevention of atrocity crimes are major obstacles as there
appears to be some form of subtle
collaboration between the security forces within the Oromia region and the
criminal mobs.
In
many areas of Oromia region, the federal and regional government were not
willing to deploy security forces in time to protect minorities. In one case in
Dera town, a father was murdered in front of his son, who himself sustained
serious injury in the attack. Moments before his father’s death, his son called
law enforcement personnel for support, but they responded by saying they were
not authorised to intervene. Instead, reports indicate that when victims tried
to defend themselves, Oromia region Special Forces attacked them.
Media
outlets were actively propagating the attacks live and giving guidance to the
attackers. Oromo Media Network (OMN) operating from Minnesota, USA, broadcasted
a series of inflammatory hate-filled messages, including calls to lock and burn
the homes of Amhara people[44]
Enabling circumstances or preparatory action
Atrocity crimes, and in particular
genocide and crimes against humanity, are processes that take time to plan,
coordinate and implement. The creation of militias, or acquisition of large
quantities of ammunition traditional weapons, machetes, which we consider as
indicators in this risk factor, constitute steps that could point to
preparatory action. Atrocity rimes, therefore, cannot be explained as isolated
or spontaneous events that perpetrators decided to commit without some level of
preparation. All the indications and evidence emerging from Ethiopia confirm
that the perpetrators, Queeroo have possessed and possess sufficient resources
to be able to commit massive or widespread acts of violence[45]. It is possible to
identify events, actions or changes that point to the likelihood that these
actors are taking steps towards a scenario of mass violence and possibly
atrocity crimes. Recognizing such indicators and establishing a causal link to
the probability of atrocity crimes is not always easy, but it is of great
relevance. The government’s rapid and forceful action is a must before we see
another wave of massacres and pogrom.
Triggering factors
The commission of atrocity crimes may
progress at a faster pace if the perpetrators have a clear plan and the
immediate capacity to implement it. In other situations, the commission of
atrocity crimes might unfold at a late stage of a situation of ongoing crisis.
It may also be that unpredictable events or circumstances
aggravate conditions or spark a sudden deterioration in a situation, prompting
the perpetration of atrocity crimes. An adequate early warning assessment should
thus be mindful of all such events or circumstances.
A good example is the protests that erupted in
Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, on October 23, 2019, following social media
posts by the prominent activist Jawar Mohammed accusing the authorities of
threatening his security, a claim the police denied. The protests, which spread to about a dozen towns across the Oromia and
Harari regions and to the city of Dire Dawa, devolved in several places into
unrest and communal violence. According to official government figures, 86
people died during the protests and clashes across Oromia and surrounding
areas, including 10 deaths
that were the result of “confrontations” with the security forces[46](Human Rights Watch, 2020). Another similar triggering
factor was the massive property destruction and horrific mass murders committed
against the Amharas and members of other ethnic groups in the aftermath of the
killing of Ethiopian singer Hachalu Hundessa[47].
Finally,
the analysis on how a previously reform
oriented Oromo Youth Movement (Queeroo) transformed into [or hijacked by]
a radicalized rampaging ethnocentric fascistic anarchist mob is an attempt
to show the danger and threat that the group has posed and will certainly pose to the security of
Ethiopian citizens, and in particular to the non-Oromos in the Oromia region,
and to the Ethiopian state. Another attempt has been to highlight that justice is needed for deadly October 2019 and July 2020
atrocity crimes. International organizations expressed concern that the Ethiopian government has made little progress in investigating the
violence and in acting to prevent further security force abuses and violent
mobs[48].
I concur with them! A third attempt has been to show that genocide is underway[49]
in Ethiopia and the risk of atrocity crimes is immense.
The Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes is also a tool for
early action. The earlier the risk factors are identified, the greater the
opportunities for early and preventive action. As times goes on, such action
becomes more difficult and more costly. As experience shows, if atrocity crimes
are already occurring, the options available to respond will be very limited.
In some cases, they may require the use of coercive measures including, if all
peaceful means fail, the use of force[50].
·
Appendix 1. Images of
protests by Queeroo, pre 2018 vs. after 2018
Appendix 2: The ‘Hutu Ten Commandments’[1]
1. Every Hutu must know that the
Tutsi woman, wherever she may be, is working for the Tutsi ethnic cause. In
consequence, any Hutu is a traitor who:
- Acquires a Tutsi wife;
- Acquires a Tutsi concubine;
- Acquires a Tutsi secretary or protégée.
2.Every Hutu must know that our
Hutu daughters are more worthy and more conscientious as women, as wives and as
mothers. Aren’t they lovely, excellent secretaries, and more honest!
3.Hutu women, be vigilant and make
sure that your husbands, brothers and sons see reason.
4. All Hutus must know that all
Tutsis are dishonest in business. Their only goal is ethnic superiority. We
have learned this by experience from experience. In consequence, any Hutu is a
traitor who:
- Forms a business alliance with a Tutsi
- Invests his own funds or public funds in a Tutsi enterprise
- Borrows money from or loans money to a Tusti
- Grants favors to Tutsis (import licenses, bank loans, land for construction,
public markets...)
5. Strategic positions such as
politics, administration, economics, the military and security must be
restricted to the Hutu.
6. A Hutu majority must prevail
throughout the educational system (pupils, scholars, teachers).
7. The Rwandan Army must be exclusively
Hutu. The war of October 1990 has taught us that. No soldier may marry a Tutsi
woman.
8. Hutu must stop taking pity on
the Tutsi.
9. Hutu wherever they be must
stand united, in solidarity, and concerned with the fate of their Hutu
brothers. Hutu within and without Rwanda must constantly search for friends and
allies to the Hutu Cause, beginning with their Bantu brothers.
Hutu must constantly counter Tutsi propaganda.
Hutu must stand firm and vigilant against their common enemy: the Tutsi.
10. The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961 and the Hutu Ideology
must be taught to Hutu of every age. Every Hutu must spread the word wherever
he goes. Any Hutu who persecutes his brother Hutu for spreading and teaching
this ideology is a traitor.
[1] The ‘Hutu Ten Commandments’ published in Kangura, No. 6, (December 1990) (http://www.trumanwebdesign.com/~catalina/commandments.htm)
Appendix 3: National pride, national shame[1]
“National
pride is to countries what self-respect is to individuals: a necessary
condition for self-improvement. Too much national pride can produce
bellicosity…but insufficient national pride makes energetic and effective
debate about national policy unlikely.” — Richard
Rorty
“If
you stare for long into an abyss, the abyss stares back into you.” — Friedrich
Nietzsche
[1]
https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2020/02/09/national-pride-national-shame/February 9, 2020
by Alemayehu Weldemariam.Access date. 2020-07-20
|
Appendix 4 COMMON RISK FACTORS |
|
Risk Factor 1 Situations of armed
conflict or other forms of instability |
|
Risk Factor 2 Record of serious
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law |
|
Risk Factor 3 Weakness of State
structures |
|
Risk Factor 4 Motives or incentives
|
|
Risk Factor 5 Capacity to commit atrocity
crimes |
|
Risk Factor 6 Absence of mitigating
factors |
|
Risk Factor 7 Enabling
circumstances or preparatory action |
|
Risk Factor 8 Triggering factors |
|
SPECIFIC RISK FACTORS |
|
Genocide |
|
Risk Factor 9 Intergroup tensions
or patterns of discrimination against protected groups |
|
Risk Factor 10 Signs of an intent to
destroy in whole or in part a protected group |
|
Crimes Against Humanity |
|
Risk Factor 11 Signs of a widespread
or systematic attack against any civilian population |
|
Risk Factor 12 Signs of a plan or
policy to attack any civilian population |
|
War crimes |
|
Risk Factor 13 Serious threats to
those protected under international humanitarian law |
|
Risk Factor 14 Serious threats to
humanitarian or peacekeeping operations |
End Notes:
[1]https://mg.co.za/africa/2020-07-14-my-son-died-the-worst-kind-of-death-horrific-details-of-violent-unrest-in-ethiopia/
; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/160-killed-ethiopia-protests-singer-murder-200705063929720.html; https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopia-death-toll-doubles-from-unrest-over-singers-murder/a-54059817; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/ethiopias-week-of-unrest-sees-239-dead-3500-arrested/2020/07/08/8eb30952-c100-11ea-8908-68a2b9eae9e0_story.html;https://www.france24.com/en/20200716-we-have-nothing-ethiopia-s-ethnic-unrest-leaves-destruction-in-its-wake.
[2]
https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=3180459308711453&id=123960474361367
(FBC (Fana Broadcasting Corporate S.C.) በጋራ ማንነት ላይ የተቃጣው ጥቃት
[4] Ethiopians living abroad are currently
demonstrating and marching demanding and calling for the Ethiopian government
to hold accountable those who are responsible for the violence and to
strengthen the measures against the perpetrators to enforce the rule of law in
the country in the interest of ensuring the security and safety of Ethiopians
in the Oromo region of Ethiopia.
[5]
According to the field report “These were the most horrific days for Christians
in the Oromo region. There are different factions in the region. Some are
ethno-nationalist and others are religious. The majority of those who got
killed in a brutal way (beheaded and mutilated) are Orthodox Christian of
Amhara Ethnicity. The other targets were Gurage, Wolayita, Tigreans, and Gammo
ethnicities. No governmental forces were present in the scene. The murders were
armed with knives and guns. Nobody stopped nor interfered. After the massacre,
government soldiers are deployed.” (Source Source: OCP http://www.spc.rs/eng/genocide_orthodox_christians_and_minorities_ethiopia. Christian world News.
[6]
https://borkena.com/2020/07/17/ethiopiaprotest-in-washington-dclondon-against-killings-in-oromo-region/
[7] Statue of former Ethiopian leader Haile
Selassie destroyed in Wimbledon park. https://www.expressandstar.com/news/uk-news/2020/07/01/statue-of-former-ethiopian-leader-haile-selassie-destroyed-in-wimbledon-park/
[8] The
genocide that took place in Oromia in recent months is well-coordinated and
properly organized. Some of the slogans or the protest hashtag are:
#OROMOPROTESTS2020#OromoRevolution #Free_Oromoo_People #Oromolivesmatter
#FreeAlloromoPoliticalPrisoners #justiceforhachaluhundessa #AbiyMustGo
#nafxanyaoutoforomia
[9] A
veteran activist from London Just wrote on Facebook (2220-07-19. 00:46. “Be cautious on the streets of London and
other major cities of the world. There is genocide declared on Ethiopians. Just
after a week they murdered singer Hachallu, and went on a killing spree rampage
in Ethiopia, (177 Christians slaughtered on a single day, the whole town of
Shashamane (even Ras Tefarians were not spared) burned to the ground, the OLF
Shane Islamic terrorists are carrying out their crimes throughout the globe.1)
Today, early in the morning, two Ethiopians were shot at and wounded by someone
wearing a white t-shirt with OLF flag engraved on it, in Fairfax County,
USA. The Police is on the hunt as a passerby took the video of the event.2)
This afternoon, five crzed men carrying OLF flag, shouting "Down Down
Ethiopia" attempted to attack my sister-in-law and her cousin, at Goldhawk
Road, Shepherds' Bush Green, just by the BP, London. Fortunately, they were
saved by strangers relaxing on the greens when my sister-in-law cried out for
help…….”
[10] Terrorism by Hannah Ritchie, Joe Hasell, Cameron Appel and Max Roser. This article
was first published in July 2013. It was last revised in November 2019. https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism. Teichman, J.
(1989). How to define terrorism. Philosophy, 64(250),
505-517.
[11] It is happening everywhere. Two days
ago, shooting reported outside Ethiopian restaurant somewhere on the East Coast
in the US. In another incident with an Ethiopian man who was trying to document
an OLFiets demonstration in Canada was assaulted by demonstrators while police
officers watched the incident. The madness is getting out of hand.
[13] Gardner, Tom (13 March 2018). "'Freedom!':
the mysterious movement that brought Ethiopia to a standstill". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Archived from the original on 29 October 2019. Retrieved 2019-10-31 –
via theguardian.com.
[14]
https://www.facebook.com/abrshzgimbi/videos/1184891861887334/?app=fbl
[15] Jawar
instigated a massacre in October 2019: The violence started on October 23rd after hundreds of
young men gathered outside the residence of Jawar Mohammed, a controversial
activist who returned to Ethiopia last year at Abiy’s invitation. Both men are
Oromos, Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, and are popular in the region. But
Jawar’s supporters, a youth group known as the “Qeerroo”, took to the streets
of Addis Ababa and other towns after their leader said he faced a state-orchestrated
attempt on his life. In a post shared with his 1.75m Facebook followers he said
police had tried to remove his government security detail in the dead of night.
They had resisted. Tens of people died. Most were stoned to death. Near Addis
Ababa non-Oromo were killed in unprovoked attacks. Spreading violence may now
have claimed as many as 80 lives, says Ethiopia’s human rights commissioner.
Some died in attacks on churches and mosques, in a worrying sign that ethnic
conflicts risk turning into religious ones, too. https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/11/02/ethnic-violence-threatens-to-tear-ethiopia-apart.
[16] For
the opposite argument see the controversial Oromo scholar’s perspective: In defense of Jawar, a brilliant
and dedicated agent of change. November 9, 2019. by Ezekiel Gebissa.
https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2019/11/09/in-defense-of-jawar-a-brilliant-and-dedicated-agent-of-change/
[18]
https://addisstandard.com/analysis-the-role-of-the-qeerroo-in-future-oromo-politics/
[21]
https://addisstandard.com/analysis-the-role-of-the-qeerroo-in-future-oromo-politics/
[23]
Waraana Bilisummaa Oromoo - WBO የኦሮሞ ነጻ አውጪ ጦር የኢትዮጵያ መንግሥት ኦነግ ሸኔ እያለ የሚጠራቸውና ራሱን “የኦሮሞ ነፃነት ጦር” ብለው በሎ የሚጠራው (ከዋናው የኦሮሞ ነጻነት ግንባር ተከፍሎ ጫካ የቀረው) ቡድን ሀገር ወስጥ በተደጓጋሚ ጥቃት እያደረሰ ለንጹሃን ዜጎች ሞት፤ መቁሰል እና ለንብረት መጥፋት ምክንያት እንደሆነ ይታወቃል። OLF Shane
[24] https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/about-us/Doc.3_Framework%20of%20Analysis%20for%20Atrocity%20Crimes_EN.pdf. United Nations, Framework of Analysis for Atrocity
Crimes - A tool for prevention, 2014, available at:
https://www.refworld.org/docid/548afd5f4.html [accessed 19 July 2020]
[26] J.J. Linz, ‘Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of
Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective’, in W. Laqueur (ed.), Fascism:
A Reader's Guide (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), pp.24–6. 1980); R.
Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (London: Pinter, 1991), p.14.
[28] The former CIA station chief for Ethiopia, deputy National
Security Advisor, author of volumes of publications and a book on the history
of Ethiopia.
[30] Dieng, Adama and Welsh, Jennifer (2016)
"Assessing the Risk of Atrocity Crimes," Genocide Studies and
Prevention: An International Journal: Vol. 9: Iss. 3: 4-12. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.9.3.1392
[31] Dieng,
Adama and Welsh, Jennifer (2016) "Assessing the Risk of Atrocity
Crimes," Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal: Vol.
9: Iss. 3: 4-12.
[32] 1. Amara Genocide
in Bedeno Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EcZJIfUkx9M. 2. Amara
Masscre in Arba gugu video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A3v9jcDAmDI. 3. Amaras displaced from everywhere ESAT
Radio https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BMw4dzDFRvU.
[33]
https://qz.com/africa/1311288/ethiopia-amhara-persecution-stands-in-way-of-abiy-ahmed-reform-agenda/
[34] Yohannes Gedamu (2020) Ethiopia
needs to end the persecution of a key ethnic group to achieve real reform. Lecturer of
Political Science, Georgia Gwinnett College.
https://www.facebook.com/100012391170623/videos/1018364305253266/?app=fbl
[40] The
only difference between the genocide against the Tutsi and that of the genocide
against the Non-Oromos in the so-called Oromia region of Ethiopia is that the
genocide being committed in Ethiopia by the Qero against the Non-Oromo ethnic
groups is not being exposed and it is being covered up by the Ethiopian regime,
led by an Oromo Prime Minister and his Ethiopianist
sympathizers.(Full-scale-genocide-of-non-oromos-in-ethiopia) https://www.branapress.com/2020/07/05/full-scale-genocide-of-non-oromos-in-ethiopia/ by
Achamyeleh Tamiru.
[42]
https://www.facebook.com/abrshzgimbi/videos/1184891861887334/?app=fbl
[44]
https://minorityrights.org/2020/07/22/ethnic-cleansing-oromia/?fbclid=IwAR260firPWyPmmysTIuMslO79EXggXmzXftyjCEYLWql-yxrQOgyzqy8gBc
[45]
https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=3180459308711453&id=123960474361367
[46]
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/01/ethiopia-justice-needed-deadly-october-violence#
[47]
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53298845
[48]
“The
Ethiopian authorities can’t brush the killing and maiming of scores of people,
the destruction of homes and businesses, and attacks on hospitals under the
carpet,” said Laetitia Bader, Horn of
Africa director at Human Rights Watch.
[49]
Recent
violence in Ethiopia’s Oromia region shows hallmark signs of ethnic cleansing,
says MRG. Minority
Rights Group International (MRG) unequivocally condemns the recent violence,
harassment, and intimidation against minorities in Ethiopia’s Oromia region,
which show disturbing hallmark signs of ethnic
cleansing.https://minorityrights.org/2020/07/22/ethnic-cleansing-oromia/?fbclid=IwAR260firPWyPmmysTIuMslO79EXggXmzXftyjCEYLWql-yxrQOgyzqy8gBc
[50]
Dieng, Adama and Welsh, Jennifer (2016)
"Assessing the Risk of Atrocity Crimes," Genocide Studies and
Prevention: An International Journal: Vol. 9: Iss. 3: 4-12.
